Deterrence theory has long been a cornerstone of international relations and military strategy. It revolves around preventing an adversary from taking an undesirable action by threatening severe consequences. The concept is brilliantly illustrated in Cixin Liu’s “Death’s End,” the final book in his renowned “Remembrance of Earth’s Past” trilogy, through the idea of “dark forest deterrence.” This narrative enriches our understanding of deterrence theory and provides valuable insights into its application in global security.
The Wallfacer Project and Dark Forest Deterrence
In “Death’s End,” humanity faces an existential threat from the alien civilization of Trisolaris. In response, the Wallfacer Project is launched, initially appearing to be a desperate and somewhat childish strategy. Amid this project, Luo Ji emerges with a groundbreaking concept: dark forest deterrence. This form of deterrence hinges on the threat of broadcasting the location of Trisolaris to the cosmos, ensuring mutual destruction.
The novel describes the elements of deterrence in detail: humanity acts as the deterrer, while Trisolaris is the deteree. The threat involves revealing Trisolaris’s location, guaranteeing the annihilation of both civilizations. Initially, Luo Ji controls the deterrence system, but this authority is later transferred to the UN and the Solar System Fleet. The primary objective is to force Trisolaris to abandon its invasion plans and share its technology with humanity.
Ultimate Deterrence and Its Challenges
Ultimate deterrence is characterized by the promise of total destruction if deterrence fails. This distinguishes it from other forms of deterrence, where executing the threat yields no benefit to the deterrer. The success of ultimate deterrence hinges on the deteree’s belief that the threat will almost certainly be carried out if they defy the deterrer’s goals.
In “Death’s End,” Liu introduces a crucial parameter in deterrence game theory: the “degree of deterrence”—the likelihood that the threat will be executed. For the deterrer to succeed, this degree must surpass 80%. However, a significant challenge arises: when humanity collectively holds the authority to carry out the threat, the degree of deterrence plummets to near zero.
Lessons for Modern Deterrence Theory
Liu’s depiction of dark forest deterrence in “Death’s End” offers several vital lessons for contemporary deterrence theory. The effectiveness of deterrence may be compromised when authority is too widely distributed. Centralized control, while risky, may ensure a higher degree of deterrence. The success of deterrence relies heavily on the perceived credibility of the threat. If the deteree doubts the deterrer’s resolve, deterrence will likely fail. Mutual destruction is a powerful deterrent but requires an unwavering commitment to carrying out the threat if necessary.
Global Security and the Parallels with Dark Forest Deterrence
The concept of deterrence has profound implications for global security, particularly nuclear deterrence. Much like the dark forest deterrence in “Death’s End,” nuclear deterrence relies on the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) to prevent nuclear conflict. The Cold War era between the United States and the Soviet Union is a prime example, where the balance of power was maintained through the fear of catastrophic nuclear war.
The control of nuclear arsenals typically resides with national governments, ensuring a centralized command structure. This mirrors the initial centralized control held by Luo Ji in “Death’s End.” The credibility of a nation’s nuclear deterrent depends on the clear and centralized authority to launch a retaliatory strike. For nuclear deterrence to be effective, adversaries must believe in the deterrer’s resolve to use nuclear weapons if provoked. This parallels the need for the Trisolarans to believe in humanity’s willingness to broadcast their location to the universe.
During the Cold War, both superpowers engaged in various demonstrations of military capability and resolve to reinforce their deterrent posture. The principle of MAD, like dark forest deterrence, is predicated on the notion that any use of nuclear weapons would result in the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. This ultimate deterrence has prevented the use of nuclear weapons since World War II, despite numerous crises and conflicts.
Modern Challenges to Deterrence
The challenges to maintaining effective deterrence are evolving in today’s multipolar world. Emerging technologies, cyber warfare, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction complicate the deterrence landscape. Unlike nuclear weapons, cyber capabilities are less visible, and their effects are less predictable. Establishing credible deterrence in cyberspace is challenging due to attribution difficulties and the lack of established norms and agreements akin to those governing nuclear weapons.
Deterrence theory traditionally focuses on state actors, but the rise of non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, poses a new challenge. These groups often do not have the same deterrable assets as states and may be less susceptible to traditional forms of deterrence. The spread of advanced military technologies to more states and non-state actors increases the complexity of deterrence calculations. Ensuring these new actors understand and adhere to deterrence principles is a significant global security challenge.
Conclusion
Cixin Liu’s “Death’s End” provides a rich and imaginative framework to examine the complexities and nuances of deterrence theory. By drawing parallels between the fictional dark forest deterrence and real-world deterrence strategies, we gain deeper insights into the delicate balance of power, trust, and fear that underpins global security dynamics. As we navigate the 21st century, the lessons from Liu’s narrative remind us of the critical importance of credible deterrence, centralized control, and the ever-present shadow of mutual destruction in maintaining global peace and stability.
References
Jansen, Kayse. “New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges.” National Defense University Press, February 15, 2024. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3679127/new-strategic-deterrence-frameworks-for-modern-day-challenges/.
Liu, Cixin. Death’s End. New York: Tor Books, 2016.
Morgan, Patrick M., ‘The Past and Future of Deterrence Theory’, Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New York, 2019; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 July 2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190908645.003.0003.
Image created with OpenAI DALL·E 3.